Renaine game stem5/29/2023 ![]() ![]() In particular, once one has adopted an evolutionary perspective, almost any empirical data or hypothesis can be discussed with reference to evolutionary models. Furthermore, although we discuss a good deal of literature across many areas, no claim to completeness is made. Naturally, the reader who wishes to go deeper should refer to the cited papers themselves, but the presentation here may assist in finding relevant and interesting topics. The author values the reader’s disagreement in such matters. Whilst the survey is predominantly neutral and descriptive, discussion of important growth areas (see Section 10) and open topics (see Open Topics throughout text) is necessarily subjective. Research is organized according to major themes and connections between studies both within and between these themes are remarked. It is intended that the topics covered here are treated with enough depth to leave the reader with a clear idea of the relevant concepts. Hence, in contrast to evolutionary models, the implications of an assumption of Nash equilibrium for out-of-equilibrium behavior are imprecise. Finally, a given Nash equilibrium might arise from many processes, even, as we shall see later in this survey, ones in which players are unaware of the existence of other players. ![]() Furthermore, different rules may lead to different outcomes and the rule that is applied may be sensitive to context. Whether these rules are realistic is ultimately an empirical question, the answer to which can be determined independently of whether or not they lead to Nash equilibrium. Moreover, even if we consider games for which constructing some behavioral rule that leads to Nash equilibrium is easy, there also exist alternative behavioral rules that do not lead to Nash equilibrium. There are games for which no reasonable behavioral rule leads to Nash equilibrium (see Section 7.6). The author of the current survey sees such an approach as an exercise in begging the question. See Samuelson for a brief description of this perspective. To some, the period of intense activity in evolutionary game theory in the mid to late 1990s had two goals, firstly to justify Nash equilibrium and secondly to give some consistent and simple selection criterion for favoring some Nash equilibria over others. The broad open spaces between behavior and outcomes are where evolutionary game theorists go to play. In evolutionary game theory, behavioral rules and outcomes are distinct. This contrasts with fixed point solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium or the Core, in which axioms on behavior are explicit restrictions on outcomes. These axioms lead indirectly to predictions of medium and long run outcomes. Thus, axioms on behavior and decision making are theoretically postulated and can be empirically tested. The process by which it changes can be survival of the fittest, imitation or optimization arising from some deliberative rule. The state variable can be a biological or cultural trait or a profile of strategies in a game. Evolutionary methods consider how a state variable changes over time. The intended audience is current and potential researchers in evolutionary game theory, as well as a broader audience of interested readers whose specialisms lie in other fields. This essay surveys recent work in evolutionary game theory, primarily as it relates to the social sciences, with particular attention paid to the work of young researchers.
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